January 19, 2026

PUBLIC ACCESS OPINION 25-016 (Request for Review 2025 PAC 89395)
Office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois
December 31, 2025

In a recent binding opinion issued by the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC), the Village of Thomasboro was found to have violated the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq.) by improperly withholding a termination letter for its former Village Clerk. PAC Opinion 25-016, released on December 31, 2025, underscores the limits of exemptions under FOIA and the Personnel Record Review Act (PRRA, 820 ILCS 40/1 et seq.) when applied to records bearing on the public duties of government employees. This decision reaffirms the strong presumption of openness for records related to employee terminations, particularly for public officials like village clerks.

Background and Facts

On August 11, 2025, requester Tania Vucsko submitted a FOIA request to the Village seeking an unredacted copy of the termination letter issued by the Mayor to Village Clerk Tana Ward, dated August 7, 2025. The Village denied the request on August 18, 2025, citing section 7(1)(a) of FOIA in conjunction with the PRRA, the Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act (820 ILCS 55/1 et seq.), and the Workplace Transparency Act (820 ILCS 96/1-1 et seq.), as well as sections 7(1)(c) and 7(1)(n) of FOIA.

Vucsko followed up with a similar request on August 19, 2025, expanding it to include supplemental documents related to Ward’s termination or separation. The Village again denied access on August 26, 2025, relying on the same grounds. Vucsko then filed Requests for Review with the PAC on September 21, 2025, challenging the denials.

The PAC consolidated its inquiry and, after reviewing the unredacted termination letter and the Village’s explanations, focused on the PRRA (via sections 7(1)(a) and 7.5(q) of FOIA), section 7(1)(c), and section 7(1)(n). The Village ultimately dropped its reliance on the other statutes, narrowing its defense to these exemptions.

The PAC’s Analysis

The PAC’s opinion methodically dismantled each asserted exemption, emphasizing FOIA’s core policy: “all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts and policies of those who represent them” (5 ILCS 140/1). Records are presumed open, and the public body bears the burden of proving exemptions by clear and convincing evidence (5 ILCS 140/1.2).

• PRRA and Sections 7(1)(a) and 7.5(q) of FOIA

The Village argued that the PRRA prohibited disclosure of the termination letter to third parties without the employee’s consent or designation as a representative. It cited section 7(1) of the PRRA, which requires notice to employees before divulging disciplinary records, and sections 2 and 5, which govern employee access and representative inspections.

The PAC rejected this interpretation, noting that section 7(1) of the PRRA merely mandates notice—it does not require consent or prohibit disclosure. In fact, the PRRA explicitly allows employers to use this notice procedure for FOIA requests (820 ILCS 40/7(4)). Sections 2 and 5 pertain only to employee rights to review their own records and do not restrict third-party access under FOIA.

The PRRA prohibits disclosure in only two narrow circumstances: performance evaluations (section 11) and disciplinary records over four years old (section 8). The termination letter was neither—it was not a performance evaluation, and it was issued just days before the request. Citing Johnson v. Joliet Police Department, 2018 IL App (3d) 170726, the PAC confirmed that section 8 bars only outdated disciplinary records. Thus, no PRRA provision exempted the letter, rendering sections 7(1)(a) and 7.5(q) of FOIA inapplicable.

Research confirms no substantive changes to these PRRA provisions since 2016 that would alter this analysis. Recent amendments (effective January 1, 2025) expanded employee access rights, such as allowing more frequent reviews and broader document categories, but did not impose new restrictions on third-party disclosures under FOIA.

• Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA: Unwarranted Invasion of Personal Privacy

Section 7(1)(c) exempts personal information where disclosure would constitute a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” defined as information “highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person” where the subject’s privacy outweighs public interest. Critically, it excludes “information that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials.”

The Village claimed Ward’s privacy in the termination reasons outweighed public interest. The PAC disagreed, finding the letter “directly and unequivocally bears on the public duties of the Village Clerk” and describes no private affairs.

• Section 7(1)(n) of FOIA: Adjudication Records

This exemption covers records “relating to a public body’s adjudication of employee grievances or disciplinary cases,” but not the “final outcome” where discipline is imposed. “Adjudication” requires a “formalized legal process” resulting in an enforceable decision (Kalven v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 121846).

The Village asserted the letter related to an adjudication because it included reasoning beyond the mere outcome. However, it provided no evidence of a formal process—only an informal decision. Citing PAC Opinion 13-011 (June 11, 2013), the PAC held that without proof of adjudication, the exemption fails. The letter, as the final outcome, must be disclosed.

Determination and Implications

The PAC directed the Village to disclose the unredacted termination letter immediately. This opinion is binding and subject to administrative review under 5 ILCS 140/11.5.

The full PAC Opinion can be found here.

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